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If They Can Raze it, Why Can’t I?
A Constitutional Analysis of Statutory and Judicial Religious Exemptions to
Historic Preservation Ordinances
I. Introduction
In 1996, America almost lost a great piece of its history. The Cathedral of Saint
Vibiana, located in Los Angeles, was in danger of being destroyed. The “Baroqueinspired Italianate structure” was completed in 1876 1 by architect Ezra F. Kysor. 2 The
cathedral is one of only a few structures from Los Angeles’ early history remaining. 3 As
an important part of history and a beautiful piece of architecture, the cathedral was listed
on California’s register of historic places. 4 In 1994, an earthquake damaged part of the
building. 5 After an inspection by the building and safety department in 1996, the only
portion of the cathedral found to be potentially structurally unsound was the bell tower. 6
The archdiocese began demolition of the cathedral anyway, without the demolition
permits required by the building and safety department as a stipulation to an abatement
order decreeing that the bell tower was an imminent danger. 7 The archdiocese desired to

1

See 11 Most Endangered Places: Cathedral of St. Vibiana, National Trust for Historic Preservation
(December 2003), available at http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/list.asp?i=133.
2
Ezra Kysor is also known for designing the Pico House in Los Angeles. The Pico House was the first
three-story masonry building in Los Angeles and an upscale hotel. See Dr. Matthew Cahn, Downtown Los
Angeles Walking Tour (Spring 2000), available at http://www.csun.edu/~cahn/downtown1.html.
3
See Cathedral of St. Vibiana, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (November 27, 2006) at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cathedral_of_Saint_Vibiana.
4
See http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/list.asp?i=133.
To be listed on the California Register, a structure must either 1) be “[a]ssociated with events that have
made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of local or regional history or the cultural heritage of
California or the United States,” 2) be “[a]ssociated with the lives of persons important to local, California
or national history,” 3) “[e]mbod[y] the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, region or method of
construction or represent[] the work of a master or possess[] high artistic values,” or 4) [have] yielded, or
ha[ve] the potential to yield, information important to the prehistory or history of the local area, California
or the nation.” Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 5024.1 (West 2004).
5
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cathedral_of_Saint_Vibiana.
6
Id.
7
See Maggie Garcia, Cardinal Mahony’s Other Cathedral: “Saved, But Degraded” The Rescue of St.
Vibiana’s Cathedral, Los Angeles Lay Catholic Mission (December 2000).

build a larger facility on the land. 8 The archdiocese believed that the historic cathedral
was outgrown and not worth repairing. 9

As a result of the dire situation, the cathedral

was listed as one of the National Trust for Historic Preservation’s 11 most endangered
places in 1997. 10 This listing sparked further concern from the preservationist
community and they came to the rescue. Because the cathedral was on California’s
register of historic places, an environmental impact report had to be completed before the
building could be razed. 11 When the demolition was started before the church obtained
permits, at the urging of preservationists, a judge issued a temporary restraining order to
halt the demolition. 12 The cathedral was saved when the wrecking crane was “literally 20
feet away.” 13 Because of the prevention of immediate demolition, the city and the
archdiocese were able to enter into negotiations that resulted in the sale of the cathedral
instead of its demolition. 14 The cathedral is now used as a performing arts complex and
library. 15 Sadly, California has moved in the direction of not protecting historic religious
properties. Although state laws still apply, California now completely exempts religious
institutions from local historic preservation ordinances. 16 Historic structures located in
other parts of the country are also in danger due to similar religious exemptions. 17
The harm caused by these exemptions is evident. Historic preservation regulation
is important to society. “Structures with special historic, cultural, or architectural

8

See http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/list.asp?i=133.
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cathedral_of_Saint_Vibiana.
10
See http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/list.asp?i=133.
11
See Garcia.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
See http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/list.asp?i=133.
16
See Cal. Gov’t Code § 25373(d) (West 2002).
17
See First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992); Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks
Comm’n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
9
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significance enhance the quality of life for all.” 18 Preservation became a major concern
in our nation in the mid-1960’s and the federal government began legislative endeavors
to ensure the protection of historic properties. 19 Today, in addition to federal legislation
including the National Register of Historic Places, the National Historic Preservation
Act, 20 the National Environmental Policy Act,21 and Section 4(f) of the Department of
Transportation Act, 22 all fifty states have preservation laws 23 and state registers of
historic places. 24 There are also more than 2,000 local historic preservation ordinances. 25
The nation as a whole and by its parts is clearly concerned with keeping our history alive
through regulating important historical structures.
Historic religious buildings are just as important to maintain as non-religious
properties. In fact, religious structures are made landmarks frequently “because of their
stature, location, and architectural significance.”26 At the time of the Second Circuit’s
decision in Saint Bartholomew’s, “of the six hundred landmarked sites, over fifteen
percent [were] religious properties.” 27 Religious properties help “define our history and
identity” and are “historic and architectural focal points” in our communities. 28 Our

18

Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 108 (1978).
See Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation,
33 Stan. L. Rev. 473, 475 (1980-1981).
20
16 U.S.C. §§ 470 et. seq. (2000).
21
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000).
22
49 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
23
Elizabeth Cameron Richardson, Applying Historic Preservation Ordinances to Church Property:
Protecting the Past and Preserving the Constitution, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 404, 406 (January 1985).
24
Sandra G. McLamb, Preservation Law Survey 2001: State Preservation Law, 8 Widener L. Symp. J. 463,
471 (2002).
25
McLamb at 474.
26
Catherine Maxson, “Their Preservation is our Sacred Trust” – Judicially Mandated Free Exercise
Exemptions to Historic Preservation Ordinances Under Employment Division v. Smith, 45 B.C. L. Rev.
205, 214 (December 2003).
27
Rector, Wardens, and Members of the Vestry of St. Bartholomew’s Church v. New York, 914 F.2d 348,
354 (2d Cir. 1990).
28
Laura S. Nelson, Remove Not the Ancient Landmark: Legal Protection for Historic Religious Properties
in an Age of Religious Freedom Legislation, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 721, 725 (December 1999).
19
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ability to recognize, remember and learn about history and its importance would be
significantly reduced if buildings such as Old North Church in Boston where Paul
Revere’s lanterns were hung were no longer around.
While religious buildings are historically important, they are still religious.
Historic preservation interests must be balanced with the competing important interest,
and constitutional requirement, to not interfere with the free exercise of religion.
Protecting religious freedom is a central tenant of our society. The First Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides in part, “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…” 29 Some religious
institutions have argued that applying historic preservation laws to religious structures
impairs their free exercise of religion. 30 Applying these ordinances to religious
institutions has been said to restrict free exercise by allowing the government to have a
say in religious matters and by not allowing religious institutions to use their property in
the most financially beneficial way. 31
Some jurisdictions have elected to alleviate any potential free exercise burdens by
exempting religious institutions from the ordinances. California’s Assembly Bill 133
(AB 133) provides religious institutions with a blanket exemption from historic
preservation. It only requires that the institution object to the application of the ordinance
to its property and determine in a public forum that it will suffer substantial hardship that
will lessen economic return on the property or will affect the use of the property. 32 There
29

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See, e.g., St. Bartholomew’s, 914 F.2d 348; First Covenant, 840 P.2d 174; Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d
571.
31
See First Covenant at 219.
32
AB 133 provides, in relevant part:
(b) The board may, by ordinance, provide special conditions or regulations for the protection,
enhancement, perpetuation, or use of places, sites, buildings, structures, works of art and other
30
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is also an exemption from historic preservation ordinances for religious institutions in
Washington. The Supreme Court of Washington created a judicial exemption by
disagreeing with other courts and finding that the ordinances interfere with the free
exercise of religion in violation of the United States Constitution and the Washington
Constitution. 33 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also created an exemption for
religious institutions. In Society of Jesus, the court found that interior designations of
religious structures violated the Massachusetts Constitution. 34
In this paper, I will demonstrate that complete exemptions of solely religious
properties from historic preservation ordinances are unconstitutional. Such exemptions
are not only unnecessary for the preservation of religious freedom but also go as far as to
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
II. Religious Free Exercise
It has long been recognized that there is an "internal tension in the First
Amendment between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause." 35 On one
hand, the Constitution requires that we protect religious freedom. But, on the other hand,
religious freedom cannot be so protected that the government is seen as preferring
objects having a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value. These special
conditions and regulations may include appropriate and reasonable control of the appearance of
neighboring private property within public view.
(d) Subdivision (b) shall not apply to noncommercial property owned by any association or
corporation that is religiously affiliated and not organized for private profit, whether the
corporation is organized as a religious corporation, or as a public benefit corporation, provided
that both of the following occur:
(1) The association or corporation objects to the application of the subdivision to its property.
(2) The association or corporation determines in a public forum that it will suffer substantial
hardship, which is likely to deprive the association or corporation of economic return on its
property, the reasonable use of its property, or the appropriate use of its property in the
furtherance of its religious mission, if the application is approved. § 25373(d).
33
See First Covenant, 840 P.2d 174.
34
See Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d 571.
35
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971).
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religion over non-religion. 36 An exemption for religious institutions from legislation is
sometimes constitutionally necessary to avoid infringing on their free exercise of religion.
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) 37 might also
require a religious exemption even when not required by the Constitution. However, if
free exercise does not mandate an exemption, Establishment Clause concerns may be
raised when religious institutions are exempted from generally applicable statutes.
A. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
Exemptions for religious institutions from historic preservation ordinances are not
mandated to protect free exercise under either the First Amendment or RLUIPA. Under
RLUIPA, “[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner
that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a
religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of
the burden on that person, assembly, or institution--(A) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest. 38

36

See, e.g. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968).
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000). RLUIPA is a controversial statute. This text reestablishes a strict scrutiny
analysis to determine free exercise violations when land use regulations are involved. However, the
Supreme Court specifically rejected strict scrutiny as the test for free exercise violations unless certain
exceptions are met. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990). The Supreme Court even invalidated RLUIPA’s predecessor, the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, holding that it was an unconstitutional use of Congress’ power. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997). The Supreme Court upheld RLUIPA as applied to institutionalized persons in Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). Whether RLUIPA is constitutional with respect to land use regulations
has not yet been determined.
38
Id.
37
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1. Substantial Burden
The first requirement for a law to be subject to RLUIPA is that the law impose a
“substantial burden” upon free exercise. 39 The phrase substantial burden is not defined in
the Act, but the legislative history indicates that the determination of what constitutes a
substantial burden should be based on U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 40 In Supreme
Court history, laws have been invalidated as substantial burdens on free exercise in only a
few cases. 41 Indeed, the Supreme Court found on numerous occasions that financial
impacts on religious exercise are not substantial burdens. 42 With little guidance from the
Supreme Court, the circuits have developed several different tests for determining if a
substantial burden exists. These tests usually require coercion or a significant constraint
on religious exercise. 43
In practice, historic preservation ordinances do not constitute substantial burdens
on the free exercise of religious beliefs. Historic preservation ordinances do not coerce
or significantly inhibit religious exercise. They do not restrict the religious use of historic
properties, but rather restrict alterations and demolitions to the structure itself. One can
imagine a situation where this may significantly affect religious exercise. For example, if

39

§ 2000cc-1(a)(1).
See 146 Cong. Rec. s7774-81 (July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Senator Hatch and Senator Kennedy on
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000).
41
See Frazee v. Illinois Employment Security Dept., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Commission of Florida, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment
Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963).
42
See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 481 U.S. 1 (1988).
43
See, e.g., Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that
a substantial burden is “akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to
conform his or her behavior accordingly”); Murphy v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 372 F.3d 979, 988
(8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a substantial burden is “significantly inhibit[ing] or constrain[ing] conduct or
expression that manifests some central tenet of a [person’s] individual [religious] beliefs; must
meaningfully curtail a [person’s] ability to express adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a [person]
reasonable opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to a [person’s] religion”).
40
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a community required a synagogue to keep a symbolic cross up on the exterior of the
building because it was part of the original, historic, Catholic Church building. The rare
situations, like this example, where historic preservation ordinances interfere with
religious exercise may be what proponents of religious exemptions are seeking to
prevent. However, almost any law could have a potential to interfere with religious
exercise. A potential for interference does not require a blanket exemption. 44 Although
historic preservation ordinances may seem to require such a result, there are no cases
suggesting that they have been applied in such a manner. In fact, no court has thus far
found a substantial burden in the context of historic preservation laws. 45
2. Religious Exercise
RLUIPA also requires that the activity being substantially burdened is “religious
exercise.” 46 Although the act provides, “[t]his Act shall be construed in favor of a broad
protection of religious exercise,” 47 the legislative history demonstrates that there is a limit
to what is considered religious exercise:
In many cases, real property is used by religious institutions for purposes
that are comparable to those carried out by other institutions. While
recognizing that these activities or facilities may be owned, sponsored or
operated by a religious institution to obtain additional funds to further its
religious activities, this alone does not automatically bring these activities
or facilities within the bill’s definition of “religious exercise.” For
example, a burden on a commercial building, which is connected to
44

The Supreme Court has rejected claims that statutes violate their free exercise rights in other far-fetched
cases because of valid secular purposes and incidental effects on religion. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476
U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting claim that Native American’s should get exemption from requirement of
providing social security numbers to receive food stamps because requiring Native American’s to obtain
social security number for their two-year-old daughter was a violation of their Native American religious
beliefs that widespread use of the number would rob the child of her spirit).
45
Regulating Historic Religious Properties Under RLUIPA, SL014 ALI-ABA 719, 724 (2005). But See
Saints Constatine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895 (7th Cir.
2005) (holding that a land use case where the town denied a request to rezone property in a residential zone
for a church was a substantial burden on free exercise where a series of legal errors cast doubt on the city’s
good faith and created an inference of hostility towards religion).
46
§ 2000cc-1(a)(1).
47
§ 2000cc-3(g)
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religious exercise primarily by the fact that the proceeds from the
building’s operation would be used to support religious exercise, is not a
substantial burden on “religious exercise.” 48
“[t]he use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious
exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise …” 49
Historic preservation ordinances do not generally burden religious
exercise.

“Most controversies involving historic preservation and religious

organizations have little to do with the free exercise of religious beliefs …” 50
Rather, most controversies involve secular, financial considerations. 51

The

restrictions imposed by historic preservation ordinances on the use of historic
religious property were just the sort of proscriptions that Senators Hatch and
Kennedy expressly stated did not burden religious exercise. 52

Land use

ordinances that restrict the demolition of buildings for the purpose of constructing
an office building or other commercial endeavor affect many property owners, not
just religious institutions. Therefore, these types of uses should not be considered
to be religious exercise.
3. Compelling Governmental Interest
Finally, RLUIPA requires that the government show a “compelling
governmental interest” for a law covered by its proviosions to be valid. Historic
preservation is not likely to be considered a compelling governmental interest
48

146 Cong. Rec. at s7776.
§ 2000cc-5(7)(B) (emphasis added).
50
Nelson at 729 (quoted by Justice Werdegar in his dissent in East Bay at 1151).
51
See, e.g., Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir. 2006);
Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck, 379 F. Supp. 2d 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Episcopal
Student Found. v. City of Ann Arbor, 341 F. Supp. 2d 691 (E.D. Mich. 2004); First Church of Christ,
Scientist v. Historic Dist. Comm’n of the Town of Ridgefield, 738 A.2d 224 (Conn. Super Ct. 1998); Metro.
Baptist Church v. District of Columbia Dept. of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, 718 A.2d 119 (D.C.
1998); St. Bartholomew’s, 914 F.2d 348; Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 420 N.E.2d 102 (N.Y. 1981).
52
See Supra at 7.
49
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because it does not implicate health or safety concerns. 53

The interest of

preserving historic properties is not as vital as the interests involved in other cases
where a compelling governmental interest has been found. 54

Therefore, if

RLUIPA is found to apply because there is a substantial burden on religious
exercise, an historic preservation ordinance will almost certainly fail because the
purposes of historic preservation are not compelling governmental interests.
Because historic preservation ordinances are not likely to impose
substantial burdens and because the ordinances are not likely to affect religious
exercise, it is unlikely that RLUIPA will apply in most cases.
B. Consitutional Free Exercise and Smith
If RLUIPA does not apply to an historic preservation ordinance, or is
found to be unconstitutional,55 the ordinance will be upheld if it is a neutral,
generally applicable law. 56
1. Neutral Laws of General Applicability
In Smith, the Supreme Court held that denying unemployment benefits to
two individuals who were fired after being convicted of peyote use was not an
unconsitutional interference with free exercise because the drug laws were neutral
laws of general applicability that only incidentally burdened religion. 57 However,
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hileah the Supreme Court
found that laws agaist animal sacrifice were not neutral because the laws did not
53

Regulating Historic Religious Properties Under RLUIPA at 731.
See Bob Jones Univ. v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (preventing discrimination is a compelling
governmental interest); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 300
(1981) (providing healthcare to the public is a compelling governmental interest).
55
See Supra note 37.
56
See Smith at 885.
57
Id.
54
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also apply to types of nonreligious animal killing that raised the same concerns as
animal sacrifice. 58 Rather, the court found that the laws “had as their object the
suppression of religion.” 59
Historic preservation ordinances are neutral laws of general applicability
that only burden religion incidentally, if at all. Historic preservation ordinances
do not target religion like the laws in Lukumi Babalu Aye. The ordinances use
secular criteria to determine when historic ordinances apply to a building and to
determine whether to allow alterations or demolitions. The same criteria are used
whether the structure is religious or secular.

It is true that many religious

structures are incidentally affected by historic preservation ordinances because the
buildings are often historically and architecturally significant. 60

But it is

important to recognize that they are not targeted like the city targeted religious
practices in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, but are only incidentally affected
because of their historic value. One clergymen said:
All cathedrals are not equal. Some cross the line, as it were, becoming not
only a religious landmark but a kind of civic tapestry in which the strands
of urban and even national history come together in a weave of great
complexity, reminding an entire people both who they have been and who
they might be. 61
In fact, courts have specifically found that historic preservation ordinances are
neutral laws of general applicability. 62

In Saint Bartholomew’s, the Second

Circuit held that, absent discriminatory motives, a landmark law did not violate
58

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Id. at 542.
60
Nelson at 737.
61
Felipe M. Nunez & Eric Sidman, California’s Statutory Exemption for Religious Properties from
Landmark Ordinances: A Constitutional and Policy Analysis, 12 J.L. & Religion 271, 322 (1995-1996).
62
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997); City of Ypsilanti v. First Presbyterian
Church of Ypsilanti, 586 N.W.2d 87 (Mich. 1998). But See First Covenant at 215.
59
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free exercise rights when applied to a church because it was a “valid, neutral
regulation of general applicability.” 63
2. Exceptions to the Smith Rule
There are some exceptions where even generally applicable laws may
violate free exercise rights. 64 In Smith, the Supreme Court implied that there may
be exceptions to the generally applicable law standard in “hybrid” situations
(where more than one constitutional right is at stake) or where the statute requires
individual assesments that could render the law unneutral. 65 Historic preservation
ordinances do not fit under either exception. Generally, only free exercise rights
are truly at stake. 66 There is rarely another valid constitutional claim involved.
These ordinances also do not involve individual assessments that could render the
law unneutral. The elements of historic preservation ordinances are not subjective
and decisions made using those elements are not arbitrary. 67 The ordinances are
“narrow in focus, and are governed by specific criteria that substantially constrain
the discretion of the agency.” 68
Historic preservation ordinances are not invalid as burdens upon free
exercise under either RLUIPA or the First Amendment. Therefore, religious

63

St. Bartholomew’s at 355.
Smith at 882-83.
65
Id.
66
But See First Covenant at 182. It has been argued that free speech rights are also implicated because
religious architecture is a form of speech. See generally Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship and
Religious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to Landmark Preservation and Architectural Review, 36 Vill. L.
Rev. 401 (April 1991). It is also plausible that historic preservation ordinances might fit the hybrid rights
exception because takings claims are implicated. See generally Penn Central at 119. However, in Penn
Central, the court made clear that it is not easy to make a valid takings claim with respect to land use
regulations. See id. at 130-37.
67
Id. at 132-33.
68
Nelson at 743.
64
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exemptions to historic preservation ordinances are not mandated statutorily or
constitutionally.
III. Establishment of Religion
Because religious exemptions are clearly not mandated by free exercise
rights, providing blanket exemptions for religious institutions from historic
preservation ordinances is a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. Despite this, a few states, either judicially or statutorily, have
provided religious institutions with such exemptions.
A. California’s Assembly Bill 133
Califiornia has what is basically a blanket religious exemption to local
historic preservation ordinances in AB 133. 69 The bill allows religious
institutions to exempt themselves from local historic preservation ordinances 70 as
long as they object to the application of the ordinance to their institution and
determine in a public forum that they “will suffer substantial hardship, which is
likely to deprive the association or corporation of economic return on its property,
the reasonable use of its property, or the appropriate use of its property in the
furtherance of its religious mission, if the application is approved.” 71 AB 133’s
religious exemption from generally applicable historic preservation ordinances is
an unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause.

69

§ 25373(d) supra note 32.
The exemption does not apply to state historic preservation laws as it is contained in the enabling statute
for local legislatures. See § 25373(d). Therefore, religious organizations are still required to prepare
environmental impact reports under the California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. § 21000 et.
seq. (2000).
71
§ 25373(d). Glendale, California goes even further by not only exempting churches from historic
preservation ordinances, but also allowing them to be removed from the historic register. As opposed to
AB 133, this ordinance applies retroactively. Glendale, Cal., Ordinance 5110 (March 5, 1996).
70
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1. The Lemon Test
The generally accepted test for determining if an Establishment Clause
violation has occurred was set forth by the Supreme Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman. 72 For a law to be upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge it
must a) have a secular purpose, b) must not have the primary effect of advancing
religion, and c) must not impermissibly entangle church and state. 73
Using the Lemon test, in East Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California,
the Supreme Court of California found that AB 133 did not violate the
Establishment Clause. 74 The court found that the law a) had the valid secular
purpose of preventing potential interference with free exercise, 75 b) did not
impermissibly advance religion because it merely allowed religious institutions to
continue to use their property as they see fit, 76 and c) did not foster excessive
entanglement because the state was not involved with the religious institutions
decision to exempt itself. 77 I believe that the East Bay court was incorrect in its
analysis and that AB 133 does violate the Establishment Clause.
a. Secular Purpose
California’s religious exemption from historic preservation ordinances
likely satisfies the first element of the Lemon test; it has a secular purpose. The
exemption is designed to protect religious free exercise. The stated purpose of
California’s AB 133 is to “ensure the protection of religious freedom” that is

72

403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Id.
74
13 P.3d 1122 (Cal. 2000).
75
Id. at 1134.
76
Id. at 1136.
77
Id. at 1137.
73
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guaranteed by the California and United States Constitutions. 78

The Supreme

Court has considered the accommodation of religious activity to be a valid secular
purpose. In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, the Supreme Court found that “it is a permissible
legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the
ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious
missions.” 79 In that case, the church terminated an employee of its nonprofit
gymnasium when he failed to qualify for a temple recommend. 80 The church was
able to fire an employee based on his religious affiliation because religious
organizations are exempt from Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination in
employment on the basis of religion by Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 81 The Court held that this exemption was not an unconsitutional
establishment of religion because allievation of a significant burden on religion
was a valid secular purpose and because the exemption did not advance religion,
rather it merely allowed religious organizations to advance their own religion. 82
In addition, in Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, the Supreme Court held
that removing a burden from free exercise by exempting a class of non-profit
organizations that included religious organizations was a valid secular purpose. 83
However, the Court emphasized that the fact that the statute exempted a broad
class of non-profit institutions rather than solely religious ones was an important

78

§ 25373.
483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
80
Id. at 330.
81
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2002).
82
Amos at 337.
83
397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
79
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factor in their decision. 84 The Supreme Court of California also found that the
mere potential to interfere with free exercise was enough for religious
accommodation to be a valid secular purpose. 85 Further support can be found for
the position that accommodation of religious exercise is a permissible secular
legislative purpose in the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith. There, the court left
it up to the political process and the legislatures to grant religious exemptions
from laws that might interfere with religious exercise.86
However, even considering the Supreme Court’s decision in Amos, the
exemption may be still at risk under the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test
because it sweeps more broadly than what is necessary to protect free exercise
rights. Because historic preservation ordinances do not impermissably burden the
free exercise rights of the religious institutions to which they apply, accomodating
religion through exemptions to the ordinances is not necessary. In Justice
Werdegar’s dissent in East Bay, she argued that overbroad religious exemptions
violate the Establishment Clause, saying “‘accommodation’ justifies exemptions
targeted to religious organizations only when the law from which an exemption is
made would otherwise interfere significantly with some religious activity.” 87
However, the Supreme Court seems to have made clear that “the limits of
permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive with
the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.” 88 The purpose of the
84
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California religious exemption is to avoid what has been perceived as significant
governmental interference into religious beliefs. Under Supreme Court
jurisprudence, even if not required by the Free Exercise Clause, this type of
accommodation is a permissible secular purpose under the Lemon analysis.
b. The Primary Effect of Advancing Religion
However, California’s religious exemption from historic preservation
ordinances fails the second prong of the Lemon analysis. The exemption has the
primary effect of advancing religion. AB 133 allows only religious institutions to
exempt any non-commercial property from historic preservation ordinances by
simply declaring that it will suffer substantial hardship that is likely to deprive the
association of economic return on the property, reasonable use of the property, or
appropriate use of the property in the furtherance of its religious mission. 89
In Texas Monthly, the Supreme Court held that a sales tax exemption
exclusively for religious periodicals had the primary effect of advancing religion
because it was essentially a subsidy that forced non-religious taxpayers to support
religious institutions. 90 The court specifically focused on the fact that the
exemption was granted solely for religious institutions, saying, with respect to
other cases where religious accommodations were upheld:
[i]n all of those cases, however, we emphasized that the benefits derived
by religious organizations flowed to a large number of nonreligious groups
as well. Indeed were those benefits confined to religious organzations,
they could not have appeared other than as state sponsorship of religion; if
that were so, we would not have hesitated to strike them down for lacking
a secular purpose and effect. 91
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Although the exemption here is not a tax exemption, it still has the affect
of advancing religion over nonreligion. As Professor Weinstein so strongly put it:
Exempting religious institutions from landmark designation creates the
potential for significantly advancing religious ideas over competing
secular ideas. If St. Bart’s is free to reap millions of dollars from the
commercial development of its property and then apply those funds to
support its religious and charitable programs, but secular charitable
institutions must comply with the landmark ordinance and so are denied
access to funds derived from property development, then religious
institutions and their ideas are given a significant advantage by
government action. Denying government the right to prefer religion over
secularism lies at the core of the Lemon test … 92
The Supreme Court of California thought differently. In East Bay, the
court specifically found that the California exemption does not advance religion. 93
The court held that the exemption merely allows a religious institution to use its
property “as it sees fit.” 94 The court noted that the exemption does not shift any
financial burdens from the religious property owners to secular property owners
and thus is not a “subsidy” like the tax exemption in Texas Monthly. 95
Despite contrary arguments, California’s religious exemption does have
the primary effect of advancing religion. Just as the tax exemption in Texas
Monthly, California’s exemption suffers a critical flaw in exempting only
religious institutions and not including other nonprofit associations. By giving
religious institutions the ability to use their property in a way that is more
economically beneficial than secular property owners may, the exemption gives
92
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“added advantages of economic leverage in the secular realm” and goes “beyond
reasonable accommodation.” 96 It may be true that “if one is an owner of nonreligious property subject to a landmark ordinance that entails real economic costs
to him, those economic costs are, in almost all cases, no different if the church
down the street is landmarked or not.” 97 However, I think this argument misses
the point. Although secular property owners might not have to directly pick up
the bill like in Texas Monthly, they are still at a significant financial disadvantage.
The exemption allows religious institutions to have more resources to carry out
their religious mission than non-religious institutions have to carry out their
secular missions; relgious property owners are given a financial advantage. This
clearly “advances” religion and thus fails the second prong of the Lemon test.
c. Excessive Entanglement
The exemption also fails the third prong of the Lemon analysis by causing
excessive entanglement of church and state by granting governmental power to religious
organizations. The Lemon test prohibits not only government interference into religion
but also religious organization’s interference with government affairs. 98 In Larkin v.
Grendel’s Den, Inc., the Supreme Court struck down a statute allowing religious and
educational institutions to prevent businesses within a 500-foot radius from obtaining a
liquor license, stating that “substitut[ing] the unilateral and absolute power of a church
for the reasoned decisionmaking of a public legislative body” excessively entangles
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church and state. 99 In fact, the court said “few entanglements could be more offensive to
the spirit of the Constitution.” 100 The East Bay dissenters found that California’s
exemption excessively entangles church and state in the same way as did the law at issue
in Larkin. Justice Werdegar found that the exemption created a “forbidden ‘fusion of
governmental and religious functions.’” 101 Justice Mosk stated that the exemption:
delegate[s] to religious organizations – and religious organizations only – the
power to determine their own eligibility for an exemption from historic landmark
preservation laws, with no requirement of review by a neutral governmental
arbiter … creating a danger of ‘[p]olitical fragmentation and divisiveness on
religious lines.’ 102
In fact, the exemption at issue here seems to entwine the functions of church and
state even more so than the statute in Larkin. That statute allowed both religious
institutions and schools to prevent the issuance of liquor licenses. California’s
exemption, on the other hand, allows only religious institutions to exempt
themselves from historic preservation ordinances.
However, it is also argued that the exemption avoids excessive
entanglement by preventing the government from inquiring into religious
matters. For example, the Supreme Court, in Amos, held that the law exempting
religious institutions from Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act did not excessively
entangle church and state because “the statute effectuates a more complete
separation” by avoiding “instrusive inquir[ies] into religious belief.” 103 Religious
exemptions from historic preservation ordinances are different; they do not
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require governmental intrusion. Determining whether a religious institution must
employ a certain individual or if doing so would violate their free exercise rights
is clearly more intrusive than determining whether preventing alterations and
demolitions to a structure would do the same. “Real estate decisions do not
implicate religious beliefs or practices remotely comparable to the personal
relationships involved in hiring decisions.” 104 Rather they are more akin to
examining financial hardship, which is not an excessive entanglement. 105
Because delegating governmental power to religious institutions by
allowing them to exempt themselves from historic preservation ordinances
constitutes excessive entanglement, California’s religious exemption fails the
excessive entanglement portion of the Lemon test. It expressly allows religious
institutions to determine if they meet exemption criteria. 106
Under Lemon, AB 133 is a violation of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment because it has the primary effect of advancing religion and
because it fosters excessive entanglement between church and state. However,
the Lemon test has come under fire 107 and two alternative tests have also been
used to determine if a law violates the Establishment Clause. Justice O’Connor
developed what has become known as the endorsement test for establishment
clause violations. Under her test, an establishment clause violation exists when an
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objective, reasonable observer would find that the statute endorses religion. 108 An
objective observer is one who is “acquainted with the text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute.” 109 In addition, Justice Kennedy has developed the
coercion test for Establishment Clause analysis. Under his coercion test, the
Establishment Clause is violated when people are coerced into religious
practice. 110 California’s religious exemption also fails these two alternative tests.
2. The Endorsement Test
An objective observer would see California’s religious exemption to
historic preservation ordinances as an endorsement of religion. In her East Bay
dissent, Justice Werdegar analyzed California’s exemption using Justice
O’Connor’s endorsement test. She found that:
[a]n objective observer familiar with the text, history, and social context of
the self-exemption power granted in sections 25373(d) and 37361(c)
would thus perceive it not as a reasonable attempt to prevent local
government interference in religious affairs or to lift a significant burden
on religious liberty, but as the unjustifiably broad award, to religiously
affiliated property owners, of a unique and valuable privilege – the
privilege of determining their own properties’ subjection to generally
applicable land use laws. 111
Justice Werdegar found that unless the exemption was justified by a need to prevent
interference with religious exercise, an objective observer “must” see the exemption as an
endorsement of religious enterprises. However, the majority in East Bay felt that the
exemption would not be seen as governmental endorsement of religion because it does
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“no more than permit the use of the property as it was before landmark designation.” 112
Similarly, Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion in Amos, found that an objective
observer would perceive the exemption of religious institutions from Section 702 of the
Civil Rights Act in allowing religious institutions to base employment decisions on
religious affiliation as an accommodation of religious free exercise. 113 Thus, sometimes,
religious exemptions will overcome the endorsement test.
I agree with Justice Werdegar’s analysis. A reasonable, objective observer
familiar with the exemption is not likely to think that allowing a religious institution to
demolish an important historic structure in order to build an office building to raise
revenue is solely an attempt to protect religious exercise. Rather, the objective observer
is likely to see the exemption as an endorsement of religion by giving preferential
treatment to a religious institution because of only a small potential of interference with
religious exercise. If the observer is familiar with the exemption and the history behind
it, they will recognize that the possibility that an historic preservation ordinance will truly
interfere with religious exercise is slim. These exemptions are unlike the exemption in
Amos where employment decisions were at stake. An objective observer is likely to view
religious exemptions from employment discrimination statutes as accommodation. The
observer will recognize that the church’s non-profit endeavors on which the employees
work are likely to be related to the religious mission. This is a different situation than
real estate decisions. It is unlikely that most alterations or demolitions to buildings will
affect a religious institutions ability to carry on its religious mission and one can expect
that an objective observer would see this.
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3. The Coercion Test
If Justice Kennedy’s coercion test is used to analyze the exemption, it may still be
found to be an Establishment Clause violation, although the case is less strong than under
the Lemon test or the endorsement test. In Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court found that
school sponsored prayer at graduation ceremonies violated the Establishment Clause
because the students were coerced into at least participating or being respectful during the
prayer. 114 By giving religious property owners financial advantages over nonreligious
property owners, we have seen that the exemption has the effect of advancing religion.
In the same way, the exemption is coercing religion. Nonreligious property owners may
feel that they should or perhaps must become religiously affiliated in order to receive
such great financial benefits. Or maybe, the exemptions will force nonreligious property
owners to only sell their property to religious institutions so that they do not suffer a loss
in value upon resale. However, it is a hard stretch to try to fit the advancement of
religion through an exemption into a coercion test analysis. I think it is more likely that
either the Lemon test or the endorsement test would be used to analyze whether religious
exemptions from historic preservation ordinances violate the Establishment Clause.
B. Washington’s Judicial Exemption
Washington State also exempts religious institutions from historic
preservation ordinances. 115 In First Covenant, the Supreme Court of Washington
created a religious exemption when it held that a Seattle historic preservation
ordinance was invalid under both the federal constitution and the Washington
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Constitution, despite the ordinance including a liturgy exception. 116 The court
held that the ordinance was not valid as a neutral, generally applicable law under
Smith. The court first held that the Seattle ordinance was an invalid burden on
free exercise rights because it referred to religious facilities specifically within the
ordinance and thus was not neutral.117 The court also found that the ordinance
was not generally applicable because it invited individualized assessments of the
property and its use. 118 Finally, the court found that the ordinance fit within
Smith’s “hybrid situation” exception. The ordinance violated both the church’s
free exercise of religion and their free speech right. 119 Thus, the court applied the
Sherbert compelling state interest test to the Seattle ordinance and found that the
ordinance was invalid. 120 To prevent a review of the decision by the Supreme
Court, the court also invalidated the ordinance under the Washington
Constitution. 121 Because the First Covenant court rejected an historic
preservation ordinance that included a liturgy exemption as applied to religious
property, it is likely that the court will mandate a religious exemption for any
historic preservation ordinance developed.
Like AB 133, the exemption created in First Covenant has a valid secular
purpose and thus satisfies the first prong of the Lemon analysis. The court’s
reasoning in First Covenant demonstrates that the religious exemption was carved
out because, in including religious organizations within the scope of those
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regulated by historic preservation requirements, the court believed that Seattle’s
ordinance violated free exercise rights under both the federal and Washington
constitutions. 122 It is not required that an exemption is necessary to prevent a
violation of a religious organization’s free exercise rights for accommodation to
be a secular purpose. 123 Therefore, even if the court’s analysis is wrong, as I
believe it to be, and the application of Seattle’s historic preservation ordinance to
religious institutions is not a violation of their free exercise rights, preventing any
infringement on their religious exercise is still a valid secular purpose.
Washington’s judicially created exemption does not fair so well under the
second part of the Lemon analysis. The exemption has the primary effect of
advancing religion. Similar to California’s exemption and the tax exemption
struck down in Texas Monthly, Washington’s exemption also applies only to
religious properties. 124 By allowing religious property owners to use their
property in more economically beneficial ways than can their nonreligious
neighbors, Washington’s exemption advances religion. As noted above,
exempting only properties owned by religious institutions from historic
preservation ordinances gives religious institutions a distinct financial advantage
over nonreligious property owners, thus causing the same type of subsidy that was
found unconstitutional in Texas Monthly.
Washington’s exemption also fails the excessive entanglement prong of
the Lemon test. The exemption delegates governmental power to religious
instituions. In First Covenant, the court found that the liturgy exemption allowed
122
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the city to control aspects of religious exercise by regulating religious
properties. 125 The court’s unwillingness to allow the government to determine if
a religious institution qualifies for a liturgy exemption essentially allows religious
institutions to declare themselves qualified. This is what Larkin forbids. The
court is “substitut[ing] the unilateral and absolute power of a church for the
reasoned decisionmaking of a public legislative body.” 126 Perhaps, as the First
Covenant court was so concerned, allowing government to determine if churches
qualify for a liturgy exemption may lead to some form of entanglement. But, as
we saw above, the cursory examination that would tell the city if a requested
alteration or demolition involves religious exercise is no more excessive than
exploring the financial affairs of religious institutions.

Such government

intrusions have been upheld. 127
Washington’s exemption also fails to satisfy Justice O’Connor’s
endorsement test.

Like AB 133, the exemption is likely to be seen by a

reasonable observer as endorsing religion because the observer will not see the
need for accommodation because the regulation of buildings does not interfere
with a constitutional right.
Fitting Washington’s religious exemption into the confines of the coercion
test is just as difficult as fitting AB 133 into the analysis. Therefore, it is unlikely
that this test would be used to determine if the exemption is a violation of the
Establishment Clause.

If the test was used, it might be satisfied because
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providing financial incentives to religious institutions may be seen as a coercion
to nonreligious institutions to become religiously affiliated.
C. The Massachussetts Exemption
Massachussetts also provides for religious exemptions to land use regulation. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachussetts created a religious exemption to interior
designations in Society of Jesus. 128 In that case, the court held that an ordinance
designating the interior of a church as a landmark violated the religious institutions free
exercise rights as guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights of the Massachussetts
Constitution. 129 Massachussetts also statutorily exempts religious institutions from
zoning ordinances. 130 Although the text of the statute could be seen as covering historic
preservation ordinances as well, no court has so held.
Despite some similarity to the California and Washington exemptions,
Massachusetts’ judicially created religious exemption from interior designations of
historic property is not an Establishment Clause violation under any of the tests.
Religious exemptions for interior designations are required under the Free Exercise
Clause. The interior arrangement of a church is intertwined with religious exercise. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized this in Society of Jesus. The court
found that the interior design of a church “is so freighted with religious meaning that it
must be considered part and parcel of the Jesuits’ religious worship.” 131
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Society of Jesus was alteration to the altar. 132 It is hard to imagine a part of a religious
structure more central to religious exercise than its altar.
Even if religious exemptions to interior designations were unnecessary, they
would still not be an establishment of religion under any of the Establishment Clause
tests. Just as the California and Washington exemptions have a secular purpose, so does
the Massachusetts exemption; it has the purpose of preventing governmental intrusion
into religious exercise. The exemption from interior designations, however, does not
have the primary effect of advancing religion. It would not give religious institutions an
advantage over nonreligious property owners. They may affect the use slightly if a major
interior renovation is desired, but is much less likely to affect the use of property than an
exterior designation. A stronger case is also made that interior designations would cause
excessive entanglement, thus, exemptions reduce entanglement rather than increase it.
Because interior space is more closely related to religious exercise, there is more of a
danger that determining if an alteration should be allowed would excessively entangle
government with religious exercise. Thus, interior designations would more closely
resemble the concerns of the Supreme Court in Amos that the government should not be
involved in decisions so central to religious exercise.
The religious exemption from interior designation would also pass muster under
the endorsement test. Unlike blanket exemptions from historic preservation ordinances,
religious exemptions from interior landmark designations will be seen by an objective
observer as necessary to protect free exercise. An objective observer would understand
that the interior spaces of a religious building are important aspects of the religion itself,
and would thus not see allowing religious institutions to do as they wish with their
132
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interior space as an endorsement of religion. Rather, the observer would see that the
exemption is a necessary accommodation.
Religious exemptions from interior landmark designations would also be found to
be constitutional using the coercion test. Because interior designations do not confer an
economic benefit on religious institutions at the expense of nonreligious property owners,
there is no governmental pressure into religious practice; nor is there reason for
nonreligious property owners to feel forced to sell to religious institutions to receive full
value for their property.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
Because there is an inherent conflict between free exercise and historic
preservation, even if it often does not rise to the level of an impermissible burden on free
exercise, it may be desirable for some jurisdictions to exempt religious properties from
historic preservation ordinances. If a jurisdiction does desire to create a religious
exemption from a generally applicable historic preservation ordinance, the cases that
have decided these issues suggest that such exemptions should be limited. If possible,
only interior spaces should be exempted because these spaces are often of great
importance in religious exercise. If a jurisdiction determines that it must make exterior
religious exemptions as well, those exemptions should apply to a broader group of
organizations than simply religious organizations. For example, the exemptions should
include other non-profit organizations, using the tax exemption in Walz as a model.
Religion-only exemptions might never be considered constitutional. However, to make
the best possible case for constitutionality, a religion-only exemption should be narrowly
tailored to only apply in situations where free exercise is actually burdened and it should
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also apply only to houses of worship, not to other property owned by religious
institutions. 133 If these guidelines are followed, religious exemptions to historic
preservation ordinances may be permissible accommodations of religion.
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